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Abstract: 
The aim of this paper is to analyse cross-country differences in the degree of inter-
regional redistribution achieved by means of taxes and expenditures in 21 European 
countries over the period 1995-2009. We rely on a standard approach based on the 
observation and comparison of both primary and disposable household income at 
regional scale. Once the redistributive effect in each country is quantified, we try to 
explain the drivers of cross-country time-series differences. According to our estimates, 
cross-national standard deviation is significant and much higher than time variation. 
Secondly, inter-regional redistribution is strongly and positively related to personal 
redistribution by means of taxes and social benefits in cash; and is negatively related to 
both the extent of regional disparities in primary income and to the degree of political 
and fiscal decentralization. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Taxes and social benefits in cash change the distribution of income. The analysis 
of this change can be focused on individuals, giving rise to studies on the incidence of 
taxes and expenditures. The amount of literature on this is huge, and is tightly 
connected to the research on income distribution. But the analysis can also focus on 
spatial incidence. In this case, the focus of interest is usually displayed on inter-regional 
redistribution and most often pays especial attention to highly decentralized countries 
with strong regional political arenas (Bosch Espasa, and Solé-Ollé, 2010). 
There are a few comparative papers dealing with this spatial incidence, focusing 
on European countries. Cross-country analysis includes the so-called MacDougall 
report (MacDougall, 1977). This seminal reference was commissioned by the EU and 
covered France, United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany. It was then geographically 
extended by Davezies, Nicot and Prud’homme (1998) to Portugal, Spain and Sweden. 
Differences in methodology and data sources involve non-coincident results. France and 
the United Kingdom are again analysed by Melitz and Zumer (2002). The list of papers 
on single European country analyses is larger. It encompasses works for Spain (Lago-
Peñas, 2001; Capo and Oliver, 2002; Capó, 2008), Germany (Duboz  and Nicot, 1998), 
and Italy (Obstfeld and Peri, 1988; Decressin, 2002). Disparities in data sources and 
specifications again make it difficult to compare results. In sum, our knowledge on this 
issue remains partial and based on heterogeneous empirical evidence.  
Hence the aim of this paper is to fill this gap. Our contribution to the literature is 
threefold.  
Firstly, we use a wide and homogeneous database including 21 European 
countries and 277 regions observed over the period 1995-2009. This new data base for 
household accounts provided by Eurostat at NUTS2 level provides homogeneous data 
suitable for cross-country comparisons. Attention is paid to direct taxes and grants on 
families, meaning that other expenditure and revenue programs are set aside (public 
health care, business taxes, or European regional policy grants, for instance). The reason 
for this exclusion is the unavailability of homogeneous and official estimates for 
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regional fiscal imbalances1. Homogeneity and coverage of our data base is basic to 
perform cross-country comparisons and establish rankings of countries. 
Secondly, we analyse the determinants of cross-country time-series differences 
on the inter-regional redistribution effect measured in the first step of our analysis. Both 
economic and institutional drivers are tested. In particular, we take into consideration 
the extent of welfare states, the diversity in regional per capita primary income to deal 
with, and the degree of political and financial decentralization. All of them are proven to 
be relevant. Other factors, such as national per capita GDP, the number of regions, or 
the European regional policy are not statistically significant. 
Finally, the effect of being a rich region in a poor country is analysed. In some 
countries there are hot political debates on this issue, most often focused on the effects 
of equalization on regional fiscal menus. This is the case of the province of Ontario in 
Canada, or of the region of Catalonia in Spain. The most repeated argument is that they 
are net supporters of inter-regional fiscal flows in their countries, but they have to 
compete with regions with similar per capita GDP, but which are net receptors of fiscal 
flows, involving a sort of unfair competition. In the first case, the highly competitive 
northeast US supports significantly lower levels of equalization than Ontario 
(Courchene, 1999). In the second one, departments of the South of France with low per 
capita GDP for French standards are net receptors of fiscal flows while they have 
similar per capita GDP compared to Catalonia and are direct competitors in some 
sectors (Prud’homme, 1999). In order to correctly measure the relative efforts made by 
the different regions, variables are expressed in terms of European averages instead of 
national averages in this section. Moreover, it gives us the possibility of comparing 
results for regions with the same per capita primary income in different countries and to 
identify extreme cases. As before, our attention is focused on household income2. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is devoted to 
measuring both cross-national and individual inter-regional redistribution effects. 
                                                            
1 Spain is one of the countries where more efforts have been made on this issue. Official estimates are 
available. On this issue, see again the collective book edited by Bosch, Espasa and Solé-Ollé (2010). 
Bosch, Espasa, and Sorribas (2002), Ambrosiano et al (2008), and Hepp and Hagen (2010) perform 
single-country analyses for Spain, Italy, and Germany, respectively. 
2 At the end of the day, arguments on unfair regional fiscal menus and unfair federal redistribution are 
mixed: if the contribution to federal budget drops, household disposable income increases in richer 
regions, regional taxes can increase and regional public services improve. 
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Section 3 analyses the drivers of cross-section time-series variation in the parameter 
estimates in the previous section. Section 4 is focused on the effect of borders on the 
relative treatment of regions. Section 5 is the conclusion. 
 
2. MEASURING THE INTER-REGIONAL REDISTRIBUTION EFFECT 
2.1. Cross-country analysis 
   Following the proposal by Bayoumi and Masson (1995), the point of departure 
to estimate the inter-regional redistribution effect is the following econometric 
specification: 
[1]=α+β⋅ +εi i i
N N
DI PI
DI PI
        
, where DI is the household disposable income, PI is the household primary income, 
sub-index i indicates the region, and N the national total (=100). Both variables are 
expressed in current per capita Euros. Coefficient β captures the extent to which 
differences in primary income are reflected in disposable income. Hence 1-β 
summarizes the average redistribution involved by inter-regional transfers, most of them 
due to fiscal flows Specification [1] can be extended to capture different inter-regional 
redistribution parameters for each country, as we do in specification [2]: 
[2]=α +β ⋅ +εi i ii i
N N
DI PI
DI PI
 
 
Table 1 reports the list of countries and periods analysed. All data is gathered at 
NUTS2 level, yielding 277 regions for the 21 countries. For most countries the data is 
available for all years from 1995 to 2009.  In order to control for potential simultaneity 
bias (disposable income can affect primary income via short-run demand effects), panel 
data estimates are discarded, and cross-section datasets built on time-series averages are 
used3. Hence, four estimates were performed: for the whole sample 1995-2009, and for 
each of the three five-year periods: 1995-1999, 2000-2004, and 2005-2009, in order to 
                                                            
3Moreover, the extremely low within-variation of variables implies that panel data based on annual data 
was mostly redundant. 
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analyse the existence of dynamics in the relationship, and to increase the sample size for 
the estimates in section 4.  
 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
 
According to the Eurostat methodology4, PI shows the income of private 
households generated directly from market transactions, in particular from the purchase 
and sale of production factors. This includes the compensation of employees as the 
main item, i.e. income from the sale of labour as a production factor. Private households 
can also receive income on assets, particularly interests, dividends and rents. Then there 
is also income from net operating surplus and self-employment. Interest and rents 
payable are recorded as negative items for households. The disposable income (DI) of 
private households is the balance of PI and the redistribution of income in cash. These 
transactions comprise social contributions paid; cash social benefits received; current 
taxes on income and wealth paid; as well as other current transfers. Disposable income 
does not include social transfers in kind coming from public administrations or non-
profit institutions that serve households. 
Table 2 reports the main descriptive statistics of variables in specification [1] for 
the entire period. As expected, while means for both i
N
DI
DI
and i
N
PI
PI
 are similar, the 
standard deviation and variable ranges are significantly lower in the former.  
 
 
[Table 2 near here] 
 
 
Table 3 shows the values for the Gini index for i
N
DI
DI
  and i
N
PI
PI
. This index is 
calculated on the average values for both ratios over the period 1995-2009. Again, as 
                                                            
4 Available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tgs00036&plugin=
1  
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expected, inequality is lower in the former. Bearing in mind that regional revenues are 
standardized by the corresponding national average and using data for the 277 regions, 
the Gini index drops from 0.99 for i
N
DI
DI
, to 0.71 for i
N
DI
DI
. Single-country analyses draw 
the same picture but also show significant cross-country disparities in primary revenues: 
Slovakia, Romania and Italy have the highest inequalities in regional revenues (both 
primary and disposable), whereas Denmark and Austria are the most levelled. 
Interestingly, regional disparities in Slovakia and Romania is due to the “capital effect”. 
Bratislava and Bucharest concentrate a rising share of GDP and population, with 
increases in per capita GDP substantially higher than in the rest of the country. On the 
contrary, inequality in Italy is due to a bimodal distribution without outliers, but with a 
set of richer regions in the North plus the Mezzogiorno. In figure 1, inserted and 
explained below, both patterns of inequality are depicted. 
 
 
[Table 3 near here] 
 
 
 
The results from econometric estimates of equation [1] are synthesized in Table 
4. In order to control for potential cross-country heteroskedasticity, robust errors instead 
of standard errors are computed. Despite the simplicity of the econometric model, the 
goodness of fit is very high in all cases, with R2 coefficients ranging between 0.928 and 
0.948. The statistical significance of the only regressor is extremely high. While the 
cross-country average inter-regional redistribution effect (1-β) for the entire period is 
0.300, there is evidence that the intensity of this effect increases slightly over time, from 
0.286 for the period 1995-1999, to 0.308 for 2005-2009. 
 
 
 
[Table 4 near here] 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Individual analysis  
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 Figure 1 shows the relationship between i
N
DI
DI
 and i
N
PI
PI
  in all the 21 countries 
under analysis. The i
N
DI
DI
  ratio is represented in the vertical axis, and i
N
PI
PI
  in the 
horizontal axis. While the number of observations (regions) is quite different in each 
country, the slope of the fit line is positive in all cases and errors remain small. 
However, the slope of the fit line, and then the extent of inter-regional redistribution, 
changes. On one end, the fit line for countries like Italy (code 10), Greece (code 7) and 
Czech Republic (code 3) is close to 45º, meaning a proportional relationship between 
both variables and then no redistribution. However, Denmark is placed in the opposite 
extreme (code 4). 
 
Specification [2] captures and quantifies this diversity. Its econometric 
estimation provides the inter-regional redistributive effect reported in the first column of 
Table 55. Countries are ranked by estimated values. As pointed out, Denmark is the 
country with the strongest inter-regional redistribution effect (0.632), and Italy the 
weakest (0.147). This exercise is replicated for each of the three five-year periods 
established above. While rankings do not significantly change, there are however some 
exceptions and, more interestingly, there is a certain diversity in terms of dynamics. 
Denmark, Sweden, Austria, United Kingdom, Ireland, Hungary, Slovenia, Poland, 
Czech Republic, and Italy follow the rising pattern pointed out in Table 3. While on the 
contrary, redistribution drops in the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Portugal, 
Belgium, France, Bulgaria, Spain, and Greece. Finally, Germany and Finland follow a 
quite erratic path. Redistribution increases in Germany during the second period, and 
then returns to the departure point in the third period; and Finland drops in the second 
period (ranked 17th) to sharply rise in the last one (ranked 5th) .  
 
[Figure 1 near here] 
 
 
[Table 5 near here] 
 
 
                                                            
5 To avoid inflation of Tables, original estimates are not included in the text. They are available upon 
request.  
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In Table 6, our results are related to those obtained in previous analysis for 
European countries, as cited above. Starting with France and the UK, Table 5 shows 
close coefficients for the five-year period 1995-1999, and similar to those reported by 
Melitz and Zumer (2002). However, trends are different. Redistribution increases over 
time in the case of the UK, and drops in France. While changes are not dramatic in both 
cases, the distance between countries increases from 0.051 to 0.077. All in all, this 
decline for France was already detected by MacDougall (1977), and by Melitz and 
Zumer (2002). Moreover, the observed trend for the UK extends the results obtained by 
MacDougall (1977), and by Davezies, Nicot and Prud’homme (1998) for the period 
1997-1993.  
In the case of Italy, inter-regional redistribution drops between 1977 
(MacDougall, 1977) and 1993 (Davezies, Nicot and Prud’homme, 1998; Decressin, 
2002). This trend extends itself to the period 1995-2009, according to our results. For 
Germany, our estimates show a redistribution effect significantly higher than in both 
studies. This fact could be explained by the reunification of Germany since 1990, due to 
the strong inter-regional differences in per capita GDP between western and eastern 
Länder. For Portugal and Spain, inter-regional redistribution would be much stronger in 
the latter according to Davezies, Nicot and Prud’homme (1998). On the contrary, 
econometric estimates reported in Table 5 reveal the opposite. Moreover, our results 
confirm a sharp decline in the redistribution effect in Spain, in the most recent period 
(Table 7). Finally, for Sweden we get a rising and stronger effect than in Davezies, 
Nicot and Prud’homme (1998). 
 
 
 
[Table 6 and 7 near here] 
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3. ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF INTER-REGIONAL 
REDISTRIBUTION 
 
 The aim of this section is to shed light on the determinants of the coefficients 
reported in columns 2 to 4 of Table 5. As shown in table 7, cross-section differences are 
significantly higher than within variation. Sluggishness in adjustment implies that 
econometric specifications have to be dynamic, including lagged values of the 
endogenous variables as regressors. Hence, the following econometric specification is 
estimated: 
1 2 1 3
54 6
it itt
it it it it
IR IR DISPARITY
PERSONAL SOCIAL SELFRULE
β β β
β β β ε
−= + ⋅ + ⋅ +
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
         [4] 
Sub-index i indicates country (i=1 to 21), and sub-index t indicates the year (t=1 to 3). 
Five exogenous variables are included. Definitions of variables, data sources and 
expected signs are the following: 
• The endogenous variable IR is defined as 1-β. Its values are reported in Table 5.  
• DISPARITY is the standard deviation of the ratio i
N
PR
PR . For each five-year 
period we compute the average of the available data. Our hypothesis is that 
inter-regional redistribution tends to be more difficult from a political standpoint 
when inequality is higher. Individuals from richer regions face significant 
incentives to limit the extent of redistribution, and inter-regional redistribution 
becomes a core issue in public debate, especially but not limited to decentralized 
countries (Lago-Peñas, 2008; Beramendi, 2012).  
• PERSONAL is the sum of direct taxes and grants to households over national 
GDP. This variable proxies the extent of personal redistribution in each country. 
In preliminary estimates we include both variables (taxes and grants) separately.  
However, multi-collinearity was strong. For each five-year period we compute 
the average of the available data.  The expected sign is positive. The dimension 
of inter-regional flows depends on the national size of both grants and taxes. The 
data source for this variable is the Eurostat Database-Regional statistics 
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classified by NUTS  
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database). 
• SOCIAL is the collection of social security payments over national GDP. This 
variable also tries to capture the scope of personal redistribution in each country, 
but in this case the correlation with PERSONAL (and with both taxes and grants) 
was not troublesome because of the cross-national diversity in social security 
arrangements. For each five-year period we compute the average of available 
data. The expected sign is positive. The data source for this variable is again the 
Eurostat Database-Regional statistics classified by NUTS. 
• SELFRULE is one of the global political, institutional and fiscal decentralization 
indexes compiled by Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel (2008). For each five-year 
period we compute the average of the available data. This variable measures the 
authority exercised by a regional government over those who live in the region, 
and it is calculated by adding four partial indexes: Fiscal autonomy (the extent to 
which a regional government can tax its population in an independent way); 
Policy scope (the range of policies for which a regional government is 
responsible); the extent to which a regional government is autonomous rather 
than de-concentrated; and the extent to which a region is endowed with 
independent legislative and executive powers. In all cases, variables are ordinal 
and with several categories. Our hypothesis is that inter-regional redistribution is 
stronger in centralized countries. While in centralized countries individual 
redistribution by means of taxes and grants are country-wide, in decentralized 
countries fiscal frontiers may be relevant (Beramendi, 2012). Decentralization of 
tax and grant programs without full fiscal equalization tends to reduce inter-
regional flows. Besides, subnational political actors tend to be stronger in 
decentralized countries. Regional and nationalist parties in richer regions are 
prone to limit inter-regional redistribution. As stated by Hicken, Kollman, and 
Simmons (2010), when political competition at national level occurs between 
parties that represent specific sub-national constituencies, then the outcomes of 
policy debates and conflicts can lead to an oversupply of pork-barrel policies 
and an undersupply of nationally-focused public services. 
A few other variables were also included in preliminary estimates, but their 
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statistical significance was very low and hence they were excluded. In particular, we 
checked national per capita GDP6, the number of regions7, and the percentage of 
objective 1-regions over total regions in each country (Espasa, 2001). Finally, Table 8 
reports basic descriptive statistics for all regressors.  
 
[Table 7 near here] 
 
 
[Table 8 near here] 
 
The econometric results are summarised in Table 9. Because lagged values of 
the endogenous variables are used, we only have two cross-sections for all estimates. 
Missing values in Table 5 explain the number of observations in columns 1 to 3 (39 
instead of 21*2=42). In column 1, a benchmark specification without exogenous 
variables is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The coefficient on the lagged 
endogenous is very high (0.909), the goodness of fit is high, and the linear correlation 
between errors, with t=3 and t=2, is quite low. The remaining regressors are included in 
column 2. The goodness of fit increases up to R2=0.86.  
The sign of the coefficients on PERSONAL and SELFRULE are as expected. On the 
contrary, DISPARITY and SOCIAL are barely significant. In order to control for 
influential observations (see the boxplot of variable IR in Figure 2), in column 3 the 
specification is re-estimated performing a robust regression using iteratively reweighted 
least squares (IRWLS)8. The results are basically the same: the statistical significance of 
SELFRULE increases and the coefficient on the lagged endogenous variable drops.  
 
                                                            
6 So we test the correlation between economic growth and inter-regional redistribution efforts made by 
governments (Kuznets, 1995) 
7 Disparity in per capita household income can differ depending on the level of aggregation. The number 
of NUTS2 regions and the average size widely differs between countries. 
8The method begins by fitting the regression, calculating Cook’s D and excluding any observation for 
which D > 1. Thereafter the method works iteratively: it performs a regression, calculates case weights 
from absolute residuals, and regresses again using those weights. Iterations stop when the maximum 
change in weights drops below tolerance. This method was implemented using the STATA command 
rreg. The software used was STATA 12.1. See Li (1985). 
 
 
12 
 
 
[Table 9 near here] 
 
 
[Figure 2 near here] 
 
 
Regarding the variable DISPARITY, we analyse its distribution in-depth. Figure 3 
reveals the existence of four outliers (data for Romania and Slovakia), and Figure 4 
shows that those observations are very influential on the relationship between IR and 
DISPARITY. In fact, the linear correlation coefficient increases from -0.19 to -0.62 
when the four observations are excluded. Columns 4 and 5 of Table 9, replicate the 
estimates in columns 2 and 3 excluding those observations. DISPARITY is significant 
and its coefficient shows the expected sign. Concerning the variable SOCIAL, the 
results are explained by the fact that the relevance of social contributions in tax systems 
is very different across countries, without a clear pattern related to inter-regional 
redistribution. For instance, for the five top countries in terms of inter-regional 
redistribution in Table 5, the comparative size of SOCIAL is small for Denmark and 
Romania, big for the Netherlands and Austria, and medium for Sweden. 
 
[Figure 3 near here] 
 
 
[Figure 4 near here] 
 
 
Summarizing, inter-regional redistribution is positively related with the amount of 
individual direct taxes and government grants, and negatively related with the degree of 
decentralization and the size of inter-regional divergence in primary income. Inter-
regional fiscal flows tend to be stronger in centralized countries with strong welfare 
states and moderate regional divergences in economic development.      
 
4. BEING A RICH REGION IN A POOR COUNTRY: SOME ESTIMATES 
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 In order to analyse the effect of borders in redistribution, the first step is to 
standardize variables by the European Union averages instead of using national 
averages. A second step is to estimate specification [1] using this new statistical 
definition of variables. Results are shown in Figure 5 and Table 10.  
 
Not surprisingly, the estimated redistributive effect ( ˆ1−β ) is much lower than in 
Table 4 (0.300 versus 0.068). Insofar as inter-regional redistribution is basically a 
national matter, cross-border divergences are not levelled. Regions with the same per 
capita primary income are subject to significantly different fiscal flows.  
 
 To quantify the redistributive effort or reward (negative effort) of each region, 
the following index is defined and computed as
−
=
i i
EU EU
i
i
EU
DI PI
DI PIEffort PI
PI
 . A positive 
value means that the region benefits from inter-regional redistribution, and the other 
way around. By construction, the size of the benefit or cost is defined with respect to the 
level of primary income of each region.  
 
Figure 6 captures the relationship between Effort and the ratio i
EU
PI
PI
. As 
expected, there is a negative and significant relationship (r = -0.67). Negative primes 
tend to be concentrated in the right part of the figure. However, some regions exhibit 
negative primes in spite of the relative low level of primary income. The cases of capital 
cities Bucharest and Bratislava, with primary income 60% below the EU average, are 
the most notable. Secondly, there is a wide variation in primes for regions with similar 
per capita primary income. For each 20-point interval, the extreme cases are reported. 
Differences in the value for prime exceed 0.3 in some cases and it is around 0.2 in most 
intervals. Thirdly, regions with very different IP record the same value for Effort. Some 
striking comparisons are Bremen in Germany (IP>160) with Jugozapaden in Bulgaria 
(IP<20); Lisbon in Portugal with Surrey, East and West Sussex in UK; and Catalonia in 
Spain with Hamburg in Germany.     
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 According to our results, inter-regional redistribution is significantly different 
across-countries and it also varies over time. However, between-variation is three times 
higher than within-variation over the period 1995-2009. For instance, redistribution in 
Denmark is four times stronger than in Italy or Greece. Definitely there is not something 
like a “European style” concerning this issue. 
 Concerning the drivers of differences in redistribution between countries and 
over time, our estimates show that these effects change slowly. Hence the main driver of 
the redistribution effect for a given country in period t is the effect in t-1. All in all, we 
show that inter-regional redistribution tends to be lower in countries with wider inter-
regional disparities and with higher levels of both political and fiscal decentralization. 
On the contrary, and as expected, redistribution is positively related to strong personal 
taxes and personal grants programs, insofar as the main actor implementing those 
policies is the central government.  
We also found that the number of regions, the percentage of objective 1-regions 
over total regions in each country national per capita GDP, and the weight of social 
security payments on GDP are not relevant variables. While there is no clear 
relationship between national per capita GDP and inter-regional redistribution (Table 
5), results also reflect that the relevance of social contributions as an instrument to 
finance Welfare State programs is quite different across-countries, and not as 
determinant for convergence in disposable income as personal taxes and social benefits 
in cash. 
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Table 1: List of countries and periods analysed 
 
Country code Country name 
Number of regions 
(NUTS2) Period 
1 Belgium 13 1995-2009 
2 Bulgaria 8 2000-2009 
3 Czech Rep. 8 1995-2009 
4 Denmark 5 2000-2009 
5 Germany 45 1995-2009 
6 Ireland 2 1995-2009 
7 Greece 16 1995-2009 
8 Spain 19 1995-2009 
9 France 24 1995-2009 
10 Italy 21 1995-2006 
11 Hungary 9 2000-2009 
12 Netherlands 12 1995-2009 
13 Austria 9 1995-2009 
14 Poland 16 1995-2009 
15 Portugal 7 1995-2009 
16 Romania 8 1995-2009 
17 Slovenia 2 1999-2009 
18 Slovakia 4 1995-2009 
19 Finland 5 1995-2009 
20 Sweden 8 1995-2009 
21 U. Kingdom 36 1995-2009 
 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for cross-country averages (1995-2009) 
Mean 
i
N
DI
DI
 
Mean 
i
N
PI
PI
 
S.D. 
i
N
DI
DI
 
S.D. 
i
N
PI
PI
 
Min 
i
N
DI
DI
 
Min 
i
N
PI
PI
 
Max 
i
N
DI
DI
 
Max 
i
N
PI
PI
 
97.8 96.6 12.8 17.8 60.7 56.0 148.6 183.9 
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Table 3: The Gini index for i
N
DI
DI
 and i
N
PI
PI
. Averages for the whole period 1995-2009 
Country 
i
N
DR
DR
 (1) 
i
N
PR
PR
 (2)  (1)‐(2) 
Belgium 0.054 0.079 -0.025 
Bulgaria 0.070 0.100 -0.030 
Czech Rep. 0.053 0.065 -0.012 
Denmark 0.015 0.042 -0.027 
Germany 0.058 0.090 -0.032 
Ireland 0.038 0.058 -0.020 
Greece 0.057 0.067 -0.010 
Spain 0.085 0.105 -0.020 
France 0.045 0.063 -0.018 
Italy 0.116 0.138 -0.022 
Hungary 0.085 0.124 -0.039 
Netherlands 0.032 0.053 -0.021 
Austria 0.025 0.040 -0.015 
Poland 0.071 0.092 -0.021 
Portugal 0.069 0.095 -0.026 
Romania 0.096 0.151 -0.055 
Slovenia 0.037 0.052 -0.015 
Slovakia 0.106 0.162 -0.056 
Finland 0.062 0.091 -0.029 
Sweden 0.032 0.059 -0.027 
U Kingdom 0.062 0.096 -0.034 
Overall 0.071 0.099 -0.028 
 
 
 
Table 4: Econometric estimates of specification [1] 
Period 1995-2009 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 
Intercept 30.2* (29.69) 
28.8* 
(16.26) 
29.8* 
(21.50) 
31.0* 
(20.63) 
i
N
PI
PI
 0.700* (67.59) 
0.714* 
(38.43) 
0.703* 
(48.65) 
0.692* 
(43.95) 
ˆ1−β  0.300 0.286 0.297 0.308 
R2 0.943 0.928 0.942 0.948 
Observations 277 251 277 277 
Notes: *Indicates statistical significance at 1%. Estimated by OLS, with robust t-
statistics in parenthesis.  
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Table 5: Estimated inter-regional redistribution effects (1-β) from Specification [2]. 
Country 1995-2009 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009
Denmark 0.632 NA 0.593 0.674 
Sweden 0.430 0.418 0.432 0.440 
Netherlands 0.421 0.447 0.438 0.395 
Romania 0.402 0.462 0.363 0.373 
Austria 0.394 0.309 0.398 0.489 
Germany 0.382 0.363 0.411 0.368 
Slovakia 0.367 0.425 0.355 0.331 
United Kingdom 0.353 0.331 0.348 0.372 
Ireland 0.334 0.318 0.335 0.347 
Portugal 0.318 0.324 0.317 0.308 
Belgium 0.309 0.324 0.297 0.307 
Cross-country average 0.300 0.286 0.297 0.308 
France 0.302 0.319 0.292 0.295 
Bulgaria 0.298 NA 0.359 0.252 
Finland 0.298 0.287 0.234 0.380 
Hungary 0.283 NA 0.271 0.296 
Slovenia 0.280 0.212 0.274 0.310 
Poland 0.262 0.245 0.253 0.288 
Spain 0.205 0.229 0.211 0.155 
Czech republic 0.190 0.126 0.203 0.222 
Greece 0.155 0.187 0.160 0.154 
Italy 0.147 0.134 0.153 0.170 
Notes: Original estimates were computed using OLS with robust errors. 
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Table 6: Studies on inter-regional redistribution. Main results 
Author Period Number of 
countries/regions 
Method Coefficient Country Ranking 
MacDougall (1977) 1969, 1970 
1973 
1964 
1970, 1973 
France 
Italy 
UK 
Germany 
Primary income/ Disposable 
income 
Gini France (54%) 
Italy (47%) 
UK (36%) 
Germany (29%) 
Obstfeld and Peri (1998) 1969-1985 
1971-1995 
1979-1993 
Italy (10 regions) 
 
Primary income/ Disposable 
income 
1-β 8% 
Davezies, Nicot and 
Prud’homme (1998) 
1993 7 countries (UK. Spain, 
Italy, Sweden, Germany, 
Portugal and France) 
Fiscal Balance Gini UK (43%) 
Spain (36%) 
Italy (23%) 
Sweden (20%) 
Germany (20%) 
Portugal (13%) 
France (8%) 
Duboz and Nicot (1998) 1984-1995 Germany (11-16 Länder) Primary income/ Disposable 
income 
1-β 40% 
Lago-Peñas (2001) 1967-1975 
1977-1985 
1987-1993 
Spain (17 regions) Primary income/ Disposable 
income 
1-β 10% 
22% 
27% 
Melitz and Zumer (2002) 1982-1993 2 countries (France, UK) Primary income/ Disposable 
income 
1-β France (38%) 
UK (26%) 
Decressin (2002) 1983-1992 Italy (20 regions) Primary income/ Disposable 
income 
1-β 21% 
Capó and Oliver (2002) 1967-1997 
1967-1977 
1979-1997 
 
1967-1997 
1967-1977 
1979-1997 
Spain (17 regions) 
 
 
 
Spain (50 provinces) 
Primary income/ Disposable 
income 
 
 
Primary income/ Disposable 
income 
1-β 
 
 
 
1-β 
25% 
22% 
27% 
 
27% 
23% 
29% 
Capó (2008) 1995-2002 
1995-2002 
Spain (17 regions) 
Spain (50 provinces) 
Primary income/ Disposable 
income 
1-β 24% 
24% 
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Lago-Peñas, Prada and 
Vaquero (2013) 
1995-2009 21 UE countries, 277 
regions 
Primary income/ Disposable 
income 
1-β Sweden (43%) 
Germany (38%) 
UK (35%) 
Portugal (32%) 
France (30%) 
Spain (21%) 
Italy (15%) 
Lago-Peñas, Prada and 
Vaquero (2013) 
1995-2009 21 UE countries, 277 
regions 
Primary income/ Disposable 
income 
Gini (1) Sweden (46%) 
Germany (36%) 
UK (35%) 
Portugal (27%) 
France (29%) 
Spain (19%) 
Italy (16%) 
Source: Authors own calculation. 
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Table 7: Main statistics of the redistribution effect reported in columns 2 to 4 of Table 4 
 Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
Overall 0.318 0.107 0.126 0.674 
Between  0.108 0.152 0.633 
Within  0.034 0.228 0.408 
 
 
Table 8: Main statistics of exogenous variables in specification [4]. Stacked data. 
 Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
DISPARITY 18.9 10.1 5.43 55.3 
PERSONAL 25.3 7.71 12.7 45.8 
SOCIAL 15.1 4.00 7.90 25.4 
SELFRULE 3.50 3.01 0.00 9.60 
 
 
Table 9: Econometric estimates of specification [3] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.034 
(1.29) 
-0.034 
(0.65) 
-0.047 
(0.90) 
0.086 
(1.23) 
0.114* 
(1.80) 
IR-1 0.909*** 
(11.13) 
0.797*** 
(10.40) 
0.736*** 
(9.74) 
0.725*** 
(8.30) 
0.630*** 
(7.94) 
DISPARITY  -0.0002 
(0.21) 
0.0003 
(0.38) 
-0.0047** 
(2.42) 
-0.0053*** 
(3.01) 
PERSONAL  0.0053*** 
(3.52) 
0.0069*** 
(4.61) 
0.0049*** 
(3.21) 
0.0061*** 
(4.39) 
SOCIAL  -0.00005 
(0.03) 
-0.0004 
(0.20) 
-00.14 
(0.68) 
-00.19 
(1.03) 
SELFRULE  -0.0069** 
(2.37) 
-0.0097*** 
(3.39) 
-0.0056* 
(2.00) 
-0.0079*** 
(3.06) 
R2 0.770 0.858  0.890  
Observations 39 39 39 35 35 
Method OLS OLS IRWLS OLS IRWLS
Notes: ***. **, * Indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. t-
statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 
 
Table 10: Econometric estimates of specification [1] 
Period 1995-2009 
Intercept 10.6* (9.64) 
i
N
PI
PI
 0.932* (86.42) 
ˆ1−β  0.068 
R2 0.961 
Observations 277 
Notes: Variables standardized by using EU averages. *Indicates statistical significance 
at 1%. Estimated by OLS, with robust t-statistics in parenthesis. 
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Figure 1: Relationship between i
N
DI
DI
 and i
N
PI
PI
  by countries.                             
Average values for the whole period 1995-2009.  
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Notes: Country codes in Table 1. DI in the vertical axis, and PI in the horizontal axis 
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Figure 2: Boxplot for variable IR 
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Figure 3: Boxplot for variable DISPARITY 
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Figure 4: Relationship between IR and DISPARITY 
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Figure 5: Relationship between DI and PI. Data standardized by the EU average. 
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Figure 6: Relationship between Effort and PI 
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